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THE WILL IN ESTATE PLANNING
CHARLES E. WORKS
Professor, University of Denver College of Law
Since other papers published in this series deal with the im-
portant and complicated problems of tax minimization and the
creation of trusts (including testamentary trusts), we shall confine
this paper to the comparatively simple problems of will-drafting
in general. Even though the matters discussed will probably be
familiar to all attorneys, a summary of common pitfalls with
some reference to Colorado law should be of value. Mistakes in
the preparation of wills are more apt to be due to oversight than
to a lack of knowledge of the law. Every attorney should build
up a check list of points to be considered in drafting wills and
should from time to time refresh his memory by reading or reread-
ing a good book on estate planning.'
NECESSITY FOR A WILL
A will is usually desirable. In many cases it is important for
a man to disinherit children and leave all his property to his widow.
Even if a client desires his property to go to his heirs at law, a
will is usually desirable. Where minors are involved, a will can
obviate the expense of a guardianship by the creation of a simple
trust to handle the minors' property until the age of 21 years.
Even if there is no possibility of minor heirs, a will usually pro-
duces a better, cheaper result than an intestate administration.
The will can assure a qualified executor, the elimination of the
expense of a bond, savings by distribution in kind, and a more
expeditious and efficient disposition of assets through sales with-
out court order.
Of course all administration and administration expense may
be avoided if a man arranges his affairs so that he dies with no
property worth over $500, except insurance policies payable to
named beneficiaries, property owned in joint tenancy, a joint bank
account, U.S. bonds issued in two names and property held in an
intervivos trust.2 Under some circumstances this plan will be
preferable to a will, but it has its dangers. It precludes the flexi-
bility usually desirable in an estate of substantial size. Even in a
small estate it frequently is unsuccessful because some asset re-
quiring administration has been overlooked.
'See check list of Hubert D. Henry, 27 DICTA 273 (1950).
The following books are very helpful:
Harold Schwarzberg and Jules E. Stocker, Drawing Wills. (Practising
Law Institute, 1946.)
Harrison Tweed and William Parsons, Lifetime and Testamentary Es-
tate Planning. (American Law Institute, 1951.)
Joseph Trachtman, Estate Planning. (Practising Law Institute, 1949.)
Mayo Adams Shattuck, An Estate Planner's Handbook. (Little, Brown
& Co., 1948.)
2 See, Merrill A. Knight, Simple Devices for the Transfer of Assets Without
Administration, 27 DICTA 277 (1950).
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In many situations a joint tenancy is undesirable because the
parties may have friction or a divorce, the financial or personal
factors may change, and if the property increases in value, the
survivor will have a greater capital gains tax on the sale of the
property than if it were received by inheritance or by will.
There is some danger in a joint bank account. In a recent
Colorado case,3 the decedent had put money in a joint bank account
in the names of the decedent and friend A, with an agreement that
A was to withdraw the money only after decedent's death and
then was to distribute it to certain of decedent's relatives. The
court held that the device was a testamentary plan and invalid
and that the bank account passed as intestate property. Appar-
ently, a joint bank account will pass the property to the survivor
in the ordinary situation where both parties draw on the account
and the survivor is under no obligation to dispose of the proceeds
to other persons. This case at least casts doubt on the effective-
ness in Colorado of the so-called "Totten trusts," e.g., where de-
cedent deposits money in a savings bank "in trust for" some other
person.
Will or no will, some money in a joint account or some insur-
ance proceeds may be desirable to provide ready cash for living
expenses during the period of administration.
GENERAL PROBLEMS OF WILL-DRAFTING
A testator often thinks he knows just how he wants his will
drawn, but more often than not his preconceived ideas will not
carry out his real desires and purposes. The attorney's function
is not to tell the client what to do with his money, but to advise
the client how to do what the client wants to do with it. To do
this the attorney must know all the facts-facts regarding the
client's family, the amount and nature of all the client's assets,
in whose name or names title is held, the client's probable debts,
the financial situation of intended beneficiaries, and what prop-
erty is to be received by beneficiaries outside of the provisions of
the will (such as joint-tenancy property, life insurance proceeds,
U.S. bonds in two names and trust funds). The attorney must
also be informed of any substantial gifts made or trusts created
by the client which might be subject to estate or inheritance or
gift taxes. The client should be advised as to the probable shrink-
age in his estate due to taxes and administration expenses, and
should be informed of the advisability of having sufficient life
insurance proceeds or other liquid assets available to the executor
to pay all taxes, expenses and debts, and of having ready cash
available to the family for living expenses.
If the attorney knows all the facts, it is comparatively simple
to draw a will which will carry out the testator's desires if the
testator dies immediately. But the testator may not die for many
years, during which time his financial and family situation may
'Urbancich v. Jersin, 123 Colo. 88, 226 P. 2d 316 (1950); noted in 23 ROCKY
MT. L. REV. 349 (1951).
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change very materially. Most testators fail to appreciate all of
the contingencies which may arise before death or during the
period of administration. Many testators are unconcerned by the
problem of changed circumstances, because they are sure that they
will make new wills whenever necessary. Experience shows that
all too frequently a testator neglects to make a new will even when
it is essential. It is possible that the testator may be prevented
from making a new will by mental incapacity. For these reasons
the attorney should consider all likely contingencies (such as the
testator's divorce, an increase or decrease in assets or debts, a
change of the form of assets owned, a change in the purchasing
power of money, a change in the family situation, the birth or
adoption of children, the possible marriage or divorce or death of
a beneficiary), and should draw a will which will probably carry
out the desires of the testator under whatever circumstances may
exist at the date of death. This is a difficult task; of course it is
impossible to draw a will which will be the most desirable will
under every conceivable set of circumstances which may arise.
Flexibility to meet changed conditions can best be obtained by a
testamentary trust with broad discretionary powers in the trus-
tee, but even when a trust is not desired, the problem must be
tackled. Probably most testators would be surprised to learn that
a divorce does not revoke a will and that a will leaving "all my
property to my wife Helen" would be effective even if Helen were
divorced from the testator at the time of his death 4 but that if
they had been divorced and were remarried at the time of his
death, the will would be invalid. 5
If the testator makes a will in Colorado and dies domiciled in
another state, the law of that state will probably apply as to the
validity and construction of the will and the administration of
the estate as to personal property wherever located; as to real
property the law of the state where the property is situated will
apply. A will can and should be drawn so that it will probably be
effective under the law of any state. As to execution, a will exe-
cuted according to Colorado law with the usual attestation clause
if witnessed by three witnesses should be valid in any state and
in most foreign countries.
It is important to provide for flexibility in the administration
of the estate. In most cases it is advisable to give the executor
power to sell real or personal property without order of court,
power to retain an asset of the estate even if retention will result
in lack of adequate diversification, and power to distribute in kind.
If there is a likelihood of the testator's owning a business at his
death, the will should provide under what circumstances and for
how long the executor may continue the business and what funds
may be used for this purpose. Our present Colorado law gives
broad investment powers, but if the law of some other state may
apply, investment powers should be set out in the will.
Semble, Moore v. Handley, 97 Colo. 258, 48 P. 2d 808 (1935).
In Re Estate of Matteote, 59 Colo. 566, 151 P. 448 (1915).
DICTA
Oct., 1952
Under a given set of circumstances probably no two attorneys
would give identical advice, and probably no two testators would
want exactly the same will. The will must be "tailor-made" to fit
the circumstances and desires of the particular testator. A very
short, simple will may be the solution, but the result should be
reached only after consideration by the testator and the attorney
of all the factors involved. The promiscuous use of stock forms
should always be avoided. In advising a client as to a will, the
attorney is not merely solving legal problems, but is helping the
client solve problems regarding the care and welfare of human
beings and should never overlook the personal factors involved.
GENERAL LEGACIES
Unless the testator is sure that he will die very shortly, it is
dangerous to leave general legacies of substantial sums of money.
For example, a testator with $1,000,000 makes a will leaving $100,-
000 to X University and the residue of his estate to his family.
If he meets financial reverses and dies with only $100,000, his
family will receive nothing. A safeguard against such a conting-
ency is to leave $100,000 to X University, provided that if this
sum exceeds 10% of the net estate, the gift is to be cut down to
10% of the net estate. On the other hand the testator may wish
X University to receive more than $100,000 if his estate is larger
than $1,000,000. In that event he can leave 10% of his net estate
to X University.
Here lurks a great danger. Assume that a testator wishes to
treat his two sons equally and leaves Blackacre to his farm-minded
son A and an equal value of specific corporate stock to son B. If
oil is struck on Blackacre and the stock depreciates in value, the
testator's main object is defeated. Furthermore there is the danger
of ademption; if the testator sells Blackacre or trades it for White-
acre or if it is taken on condemnation proceedings, A gets nothing.
Similarly B's gift may be defeated if the testator sells the stock
or if it is exchanged in a reorganization or merger for new stock
which the court feels is a change in substance rather than in mere
form. Even a stock dividend may cut down the value of B's gift.
A gift of "10 shares of X stock" will be treated as general and
not subject to ademption, whereas a gift of "my 10 shares of X
stock" is a specific gift subject to ademption. 6 It is much safer to
give the principal beneficiaries fractional shares of the estate or of
the residue than to leave them specific gifts of the major assets.
While specific gifts of major assets are to be avoided, property
having primarily a sentimental rather than monetary value (such
as heirlooms, furniture, jewelry and personal effects) is usually
specifically bequeathed. Such property should not be allowed to
pass into a trust fund, nor should it go into the residue as it may
then have to be sold. If such property is given to several persons
in equal shares, family squabbles may be avoided by giving the
executor broad authority as to the method of division. Frequently
'Bond v. Evans, 92 Colo. 1, 17 P. 2d 311 (1932).
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a testator wishes to have his effects divided among friends or
relatives in accordance with directions which the testator will
give after the will is executed and which may be changed from
time to time. This is clearly illegal, and there is no safe way to
accomplish this result unless the testator is willing to leave the
property outright (with no strings attached and no desires or
wishes expressed) to some person who the testator trusts will
carry out the moral obligation. Such person might be legally
bound as a constructive trustee, but this involves uncertainty as
to proof. Such a device should not be used if the property is of
sufficient value to be subject to gift taxes.
Frequently the testator will wish to make a specific gift of
the family residence rather than have it pass into the residue. If
he leaves "my residence at No. 100 Main St." and later sells it
and purchases another residence, nothing will pass. The will should
clearly state that any residence owned at the time of death is to
pass; but in wording the will, consideration should be given to
the possibility of the testator having more than one residence, such
as a winter home and a summer home. If a residence or any other
property is given specifically and there is the possibility that it
will be encumbered, it should be stated whether it is to pass sub-
ject to the lien or whether the executor is to pay off the lien from
other assets of the estate.
PRIORITY OF LEGACIES
If there are insufficient assets to pay all of the legacies, some
will be abated. The testator can provide the order of abatement.
For example, if the will leaves an automobile to A, $10,000 to B
and $10,000 to C, it may also provide that if the assets are insuffi-
cient to satisfy all three gifts, the gift to A shall abate first, then
the gift to B. This will give C the first preference and will gen-
erally be much more satisfactory than an attempt to prefer C by
the clumsy and uncertain device of a demonstrative legacy, e.g.,
"$10,000 to C, payable out of my savings bank account."
The law is not entirely clear as to how gifts will be abated
if the surviving spouse elects to take the statutory share instead
of taking under the will. The will should make it clear how the
balance of the estate is to be disposed of in this event.
LIFE ESTATES AND REMAINDERS
Where property is not to be given outright, a trust is usually
advisable. If a legal life estate and a legal remainder are created,
the will should state whether or not the life tenant is to post a
bond and is to be liable for repairs and waste. The will should also
state who is to take in the event the remaindermen all die before
the life tenant. If a remainder (either legal or equitable) is cre-
ated for a class, extreme care should be exercised in defining the
class and the time at which the class is to be determined. For
example, a gift "to A for life and then to A's children" is am-
biguous. Are children born to A after the testator's death to take?
DICTA
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Do the children take a vested remainder, or is their interest con-
tingent on surviving A? What happens if A has a child who dies
before A, leaving issue who survive A?
CHILDREN, AFTER-BORN CHILDREN AND ADOPTED CHILDREN
Does a gift to "children" or "issue" or "descendants" include
adopted children? The Colorado Supreme Court has held that a
gift to the testator's children includes adopted children, but a gift
to the children of any other person does not include adopted chil-
dren. 7 The will should clearly specify whether or not adopted
children are to be included. Certainly most testators intend to
include their own adopted children. Suppose a testator leaves
property in trust for his child A for life with a remainder to A's
children. Probably most testators would wish children adopted
by A bona fide to take whether adopted before or after the date of
the will or the date of death. But the fact that an adult may be
adopted, would put A in the position of being able to make an
advantageous deal to adopt a friend and thus defeat a gift over
to other relatives of the testator.
Frequently a testator wishes his widow to take all of his prop-
erty to the exclusion of any children. In most states (including
Colorado), children born after the will is executed will take their
intestate share unless expressly disinherited, and in many states
(not including Colorado), children alive when the will is made
will take unless expressly excluded. Every will should name all
existing children (natural or adopted) and should state whether
these children and any children born to, or adopted by, the testator
after the will is made are to take or are to be disinherited. A
Colorado case 8 dramatically illustrates the necessity for such a
provision. The testator, who had a child A, made a will leaving
all his property to his wife with no mention of children. Child B
was later born to the testator who later died, survived by A, B
and his widow. The court held that A was disinherited and took
nothing, B took his intestate share of one-quarter and the widow
took three-quarters of the estate.
Whenever any person or persons under 21 years of age may
be entitled to property under a will, it is important to consider
the advisability of avoiding the expense and red-tape of a guardian-
ship of the property. This can be accomplished by a trust, or, in
the case of tangible property of no investment value, by directing
the delivery of the property to the person having custody of the
minor. If a minor is given an interest in a trust fund, the trustee
can be authorized to expend the money for the minor without a
guardian being appointed.
Ordinarily a gift to children will not include illegitimate
children. In this day of Mexican and Reno divorces of doubtful
validity, the legitimacy of children born of a subsequent marriage
Brunton v. International Trust Co., 114 Colo. 298, 164 P. 2d 472 (1945).
8
Lowery v. Harlow, 22 Colo. App. 73, 123 P. 143 (1912).
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may be questionable. In rare cases it may be advisable to insert
a provision to insure that such children will take regardless of
the jurisdictional infirmity of the prior divorce. 9
LAPSE
Since the anti-lapse statutes vary from state to state, it is a
wise precaution to insert the condition "if he survives me" in
connection with each gift. If the lapsed legacy is not to pass into
the residue, the will should provide specifically who is to take in
case the legatee predeceases the testator.
RESIDUARY CLAUSE
Unless the will expressly applies to all of the testator's prop-
erty, there should be a residuary clause so as to make sure that
there will be no intestate property. Powers of appointment are
more commonly used since the Revenue Act of 1948, so it is now
always advisable to determine whether the testator is the donee
of a power or is likely to become the donee of a power. The will
should expressly state whether it is, or is not, to operate as an
exercise of the power. A general residuary clause may be construed
as the exercise of a power. This may have unexpected tax con-
sequences. Also if the will creates trusts, they may violate the
Rule Against Perpetuities as to the appointed property, since the
period starts to run from the date of creation of the power rather
than from the date of the death of the donee of the power.
It is important to make sure that there will be no failure of
legatees under any contingency. If the will leaves the residue "to
A, B and C in equal shares" and A dies before the testator, B and
C will take only two-thirds of the residue and one-third will be
intestate property. 10 Even if the will provided that A, B and C
or such of them as survived the testator should take the whole
residue, there would be no disposition of the property if all three
of them predeceased the testator. There should be a catch-all pro-
vision stating who is to take in the event all legatees or contingent
legatees predecease the testator or all remaindermen predecease
a life tenant. The property may be left to a charity sure to be
in existence, or to the persons who Would be the testator's heirs
if the testator had died at the time of the failure of the gift.
PAYMENT OF TAXES
Regardless of all questions of tax minimization, every will
should specify how the burden of the federal estate tax and state
inheritance taxes is to be borne by the different legatees. If a
testator leaves $1,000 to A and a diamond necklace to B, he will
usually want the taxes paid out of the residue so that A and B will
receive their gifts tax-free. Consideration must be given to the
taxes on property which does not pass under the will, such as
life insurance, joint-tenancy property and inter-vivos gifts taxed
Shattuck, op. cit. note 1 at pp. 364, 365.
"Feeney v. Mahoney, 121 Colo. 599, 221 P. 2d 357 (1950).
Feeney v. Mahoney, 123 Colo. 448, 231 P. 2d 465 (1951).
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as in contemplation of death. No general rule can be laid down
as to the best tax apportionment provision for all situations. 1
ADVANCEMENTS
Advancements made prior to the execution of a will are not
taken into account unless the will so provides. Payments made to
a legatee after the making of a will may or may not be considered
as made in satisfaction or partial satisfaction of the legacy, de-
pending on the circumstances. In some cases where property is
left to children in equal shares, the testator may want a provision
that any sum paid to any child is to be taken into account by way
of hotchpot.
INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE
If possible, an attorney should avoid uncertainty by putting
all provisions in the will itself. Often a testator wishes to have
part of his estate added to an existing intervivos trust, and incor-
porates the terms of the trust by reference. If the trust is revoca-
ble or amendable, the gift will probably be invalid unless the will
makes it clear that the property is to be held according to the
terms of the trust as it existed at the date of execution of the will
regardless of future amendments. Gifts to charitable trusts whose
papers are filed with the Secretary of State may be made by refer-




The Colorado Simultaenous Death Act does not apply to a
situation where there is any substantial evidence that one of the
parties survived the other by even a few seconds.13 To meet this
situation, some attorneys insert a provision in the will that the
legatee shall not take if he dies as the result of a common disaster
with the testator. This provision is subject to the objections that
the cause of death is sometimes uncertain and that the survivor
may linger for an indefinite period. A provision that the legatee
shall take only if living thirty days (or any other period not ex-
ceeding six months) after the date of death of the testator would
appear to be more certain and effective. Such a clause should not
be used regarding a spouse if it is more important to get the
benefit of the marital deduction for estate tax purposes than to
prevent the property passing to the spouse's estate. It is probably
wiser to omit any provision on the subject, except in cases where
the spouses have no children and survivorship will determine
whether the property goes to the husband's relatives or the wife's
relatives.'
4
"' Trachtman, op. cit. note 1 at pp. 48-55; Tweed and Parsons, op. cit. note 1
at p. 68.
"COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 4, §§184-186 (1935).
11 Sauers v. Stolz, 121 Colo. 456, 218 P. 2d 741 (1950).
" Trachtman, op. cit. note 1 at pp. 56-63.
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MUTUAL WILLS
If two persons contract orally or in writing to make wills in
which each leaves all of his property to the other, or in which
each leaves a life estate to the other with the remainder to a spe-
cified person, the wills are irrevocable and the contracts are en-
forceable in equity. It has been held in Colorado that the simul-
taneous execution of mutual wills creates a presumption of such
a contract.15 Obviously such contracts should not be entered into
in most instances. Many husbands and wives simultaneously make
mutual wills with no intent that either party shall be under obliga-
tion not to change his will. In such case it is essential to have
some evidence that there was no contract between the parties. A
statement to this effect in each of the wills should be sufficient, if
the wills are executed in duplicate and an executed copy of each
will is retained by the attorney. This will not be satisfactory to
those attorneys who object to the execution of wills in duplicate.
If the wills are not to be executed in duplicate, or if it seems in-
advisable to put such a provision in the wills, it is a simple matter
to have a statement of the facts signed by both parties and wit-
nessed by the attesting witnesses to the wills. If such statement
is executed in triplicate and one copy kept by each party and one
copy kept by the attorney, there should be no difficulty in rebutting
this rather artificial presumption.
PAYMENT OF DEBTS
It would seem to be immaterial whether a will is silent as to
payments of debts, or directs the executor not to pay any debts,
or directs that all just debts be paid. In any event the statutes
provide for the payment of debts. A direction to pay debts should
not protect an executor who pays an invalid claim or pays a debt
barred by a Statute of Limitations or non-claim. 6 The insertion
of such a clause might open the door for the argument that the
testator intended to make the executor a trustee to pay all credi-
tors whether their claims were barred or not and whether filed
or not. If the testator wishes specific barred claims or unfiled
claims paid, he can specifically give the creditor a right as a legatee
but not as a creditor. A general direction to pay debts appears
to be futile at best and might create an uncertainty.
CONCLUSION
This paper has pointed out a few important problems which
might be overlooked, with no attempt at complete coverage or
complete discussion. I hope that the discussion has been sufficient
to illustrate the necessity for an estate plan in every case and for
the careful search for unexpected contingencies which may arise.
The exact wording of a will is also a matter requiring great care.
15Trindle v. Zimmerman, 115 Colo. 323, 172 P. 2d 676 (1946).
Hoff v. Armbruster ....... Colo ........ 242 P. 2d 604 (1952).
"Crowley v. Farmers Bank, 109 Colo. 146, 123 P. 2d 407 (1942).
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Former Judge Kettering of the Denver County Court once re-
marked that the most common weakness in will-drafting was the
inability of the will draftsman to use the English language clearly
and precisely. No will of any complexity should be signed until
at least two attorneys have checked it-every one of us occasionally
has an intellectual or linguistic blind spot. Finally, the attorney's
job is not complete unless he periodically checks the wills he has
drawn in the light of any changed conditions and reviews the
situation with his client whenever a new will may be advisable.
TRANSFERS TAKING EFFECT AT OR
UPON DEATH
T. RABER TAYLOR
of the Denver Bar
When we talk about transfers taking effect at or upon death
we are generally talking about rich man's law. Generally we are
lalking about the Law of Trusts and the Law of Future Interests
and their impeding effect on the imposition of death taxes and
income taxes. A short translation of the terms "transfers taking
effect at or upon death" is a string between the donor and the
donee. Unfortunately, it is this string upon which has been played
the sad note of tax victories for the Government.
Any study of transfers taking effect at or upon death is also
a study of the law of the Philadelphia property lawyer. The first
inheritance tax law in the United States was passed in Pennsyl-
vania in 1862. This law anticipated the desire of Philadelphia
property lawyers to avoid the imposition of the inheritance tax
which applied to property passing at death. Accordingly, the
law imposes the inheritance tax on transfers intended to take effect
in possession or enjoyment at or upon death. The techniques de-
veloped by the Philadelphia property lawyers were brought into
the Federal tax area with the passage of the Federal Estate Tax
Law in 1916. From the passage of the federal law on, September
8, 1916 and down to 1935, well drafted property law trusts in-
volving future interests, were successful in insulating large estates
from the federal estate tax. Some of the celebrated taxpayer vic-
tories well known to us are: Shukert v. Allen,' Reinecke v. North-
ern Trust Company,2 May v. Heiner,3 and Helvering v. St. Louis
Union Trust Company.4 Each of these decisions, with the excep-
tion possibly of Shukert v. Allen, has been expressly overruled
either by the United States Supreme Court or by Congress. The
tide began to run against the taxpayers in 1940. You all recall
the celebrated case of Helvering v. Hallock 5 which reversed Helver-
ing v. St. Louis Union Trust Company and held that whenever
'273 U. S. 545 (1927).
2 278 U. S. 339 (1929).
3 281 U. S. 238 (1930).
4 296 U. S. 39 (1935).
'309 U. S. 106 (1940).
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